Summary: This paper analyzes the estimation of time-invariant variables in panel data models with unit-effects. We compare three procedures that have frequently been employed in comparative politics, namely pooled-OLS, random effects and the Hausman-Taylor model, to a vector decomposition procedure that allows estimating time-invariant variables in an augmented fixed effects approach. The procedure we suggest consists of three stages: the first stage runs a fixed-effects model without time-invariant variables, the second stage decomposes the uniteffects vector into a part explained by the time-invariant variables and an error term, and the third stage re-estimates the first stage by pooled-OLS including the time invariant variables plus the error term of stage 2. We use Monte Carlo simulations to demonstrate that this method works better than its alternatives in estimating typical models in comparative politics. Specifically, the unit fixed effects vector decomposition technique performs better than both pooled OLS and random effects in the estimation of time-invariant variables correlated with the unit effects and better than Hausman-Taylor in estimating the time-invariant variables correlated with the unit effects. Finally, we re-analyze recent work by Huber and Stephens (2001) as well as by Beramendi and Cusack (2004) . These analyses seek to cope with the problem of time-invariant variables in panel data.
Introduction
Since the publication of Nathaniel Beck's and Jonathan Katz's influential article on pooled time-series analysis (Beck/ Katz 1995) analyzing panel data has become a standard in comparative political science. As political scientists have frequently observed, standards provide focal points and they are applied because deviations from these standards are likely to be costly. In comparative politics, referees may impose 'sanctions' on researchers that deviate from pooling. Beyond this obvious incentive structure, pooling also has some objective advantages.
Social scientists are often interested in explaining the variance of trends across units so that neither cross-sectional nor time-series analyses provide relevant tests of the theory. Hence, pooling is warranted. At times, researchers have analyzed panel data because pooling increases the number of observations.
The most important methodical advantage of panel data relates to the growing concern of applied researchers about bias resulting from omitted variables.
Contrary to a cross-section or a pure time-series panel data analyses allow controlling for unit fixed-effects that -as most researchers believe -capture the systematic influences from omitted variables. This belief is not wrong but potentially misleading, since unit fixed effects do not eliminate all kinds of omitted variable bias. Time-variant omitted variables may still bias the estimates.
Thus, one danger of fixed effects models is that many researchers believe that the inclusion of unit dummies precludes problems with omitted variables.
Unit effects represent "all factors (…) that do not change over time" (Wooldridge 1999: 420) . In other words, unit-fixed effects account for time-invariant crosssectional effects -may they be observed or unobserved. This has two obvious but notable consequences: on the one hand, unit dummies do not necessarily eliminate omitted variable bias; on the other hand, unit fixed effects models cannot estimate the coefficients of theoretically interesting time-invariant variables.
For the latter reason the quest to include or exclude country dummies has stimulated a lively debate among political scientists. While some authors suggest that country dummies are needed to account for the "underlying historical fabric (…) that is not captured by any of the time and country-varying regressors" (Garrett/ Mitchell 2001: 163) , others claim that unit fixed effects throw out the baby with the bath water", because political scientist are mainly interested in institutional effects and institutions do not vary much over time (Kittel/ Obinger 2002: 21) . This paper discusses potential remedies for the estimation of time-invariant variables in panel-data analyses with unit effects. We compare three procedures that have frequently been used in comparative politics -namely pooled-OLS, random effects and the Hausman-Taylor formulation -to a vector decomposition procedure that allows estimating time-invariant variables in an augmented fixed effects approach. The model we advocate consists of three stages: in the first stage we run a fixed-effects model, in the second stage the unit-effects vector is decomposed into a part explained by the time-invariant variables and an error term, in the third stage we re-estimate the first stage including the time invariant variables and the error term obtained in stage 2 by pooled-OLS.
We evaluate the small-sample properties of the procedure we advocate (dubbed xtfevd for fixed effect vector decomposition) to pooled OLS, random effects and Hausman-Taylor. Monte Carlo simulations demonstrate that xtfevd is on average less biased than the available alternatives. Moreover, xtfevd has better small sample properties than Hausman-Taylor. At the same time it is less biased than random effects and pooled OLS when unit effects are correlated with time-variant variables. xtfevd outperforms pooled OLS and random effects in estimating timevariant variables that are correlated with the unit effects ( ) and it is more adequate than Hausman-Taylor in calculating the effect of time-variant variables that are correlated with the unit effects. Thus, employing the unit fixed effects vector decomposition technique appears to be superior for the analysis of datagenerating processes typical for panel data in comparative politics.
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We will also identify one situation in which neither of the four models does particularly well. When the unit-effects are correlated with exogenous variables and highly skewed, all methods give biased estimates.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly (re-) introduces the alternative procedures to the reader. Section 3 presents the xtfevd estimator. In section 4, we compare existing approaches by conducting Monte Carlo simulations. Section 5 re-analyzes Evelyn Huber and John D. Stephens (2001) examination of the impact of constitutional features on the dynamics of social welfare spending and Pablo Beramendi and Thomas Cusack's (2004) analysis of the political determinants of income inequality. Section 6 concludes.
The estimation of time-invariant variables
Time-invariant variables can be distinguished into two broadly defined categories.
The first type subsumes variables that are time-invariant by definition. Often, these variables measure geography or inheritance. Switzerland and Hungary are both landlocked countries, they are both located in Central Europe, and there is little nature and (hopefully) politics will do about it for the foreseeable future.
Along similar lines, a country may or may not have a colonial heritage or a climate prone to tropical diseases.
The second category covers variables that are time-invariant for the period under analysis or because of researchers' selection of cases. For instance, constitutions in postwar OECD countries have proven to be highly durable. Switzerland is a democracy since 1291 and the US maintained a presidential system since independence day. Yet, by increasing the number of periods and/or the number of cases it would be possible to render these variables time-variant. This suggests that many variables are time-invariant because of researchers' deliberate choice.
At times, researchers even suppress time-varying information and operationalize a theoretically plausible influence as (time-invariant) dichotomous variable even though a (time-varying) continuous alternative exists.
Adding observations may be preferable to searching for remedies of estimating panel data that include time-invariant variables. We suggest that researchers first consider broadening their sample of units or lengthening the time period under observation rather than employing one of the procedures we discuss here.
Nevertheless, all methods enable researchers to estimate variables that are timeinvariant by nature or by researchers' decision.
One reason for suppressing time-series variance could be that variables rarely change. The identification of the effect of an almost time-invariant variable is difficult. By taking the unit means one can treat any changing variable as timeinvariant. Whether this is an appropriate research strategy clearly depends on the alternatives. From our perspective it is likely that testing the theory within a broader research design -one that includes more observations -is a superior research strategy.
Most applied researchers have at one point been confronted with the appropriate estimation of time-invariant variables of theoretical interest. Even a brief look into datasets frequently used in political science reveals that time-invariant variables are by no means rare. Many datasets contain variables that are time-invariant over relatively long periods. For example, data on political institutions usually includes constitutional variables that rarely and slowly change.
Since no standard method exists, astonishingly diverse ways to deal with the problem of time-invariant variables have been employed in the literature. This section briefly discusses the procedures in use. Before doing so, however, a few remarks on notation are in order. We assume the following data generating 
These assumptions are likely to be satisfied in most data analyzed in comparative politics.
Having said this, we now explain how applied researchers have dealt with the estimation problems associated with this data generating process. To begin, all three procedures have in common that researchers shied away from controlling for fixed effects because the unit effect dummies and the time-invariant variables are perfectly collinear. Scholars either run random effects (often regardless of inconsistency), employ the Hausman-Taylor formulation (which is available in Stata since version 8.0), or neglect individual effects altogether and rather run a pooled OLS model. We discuss all potential remedies in turn.
The first 'solution' to the estimation problems posed by time-invariant variables is to ignore the possibility of unit effects. our interest is in the historically-determined component of institutions (that is more clearly exogenous), hence not in the variations in institutions from year-toyear. As a result, this regression does not (cannot) control for a full set of country dummies." (Acemoglu et al. 2002: 27) 
Moreover, random effects are based on a feasible gls estimator where the Omega matrix has a special random effects structure. Rather than depending on T(T+1)/2 unrestricted variances and covariances as it is the case in a normal GLS model, Omega only depends on the variances of and i u it ε regardless of the size of T:
2 But probably most importantly, real world data rarely satisfies the conditions under which random effects estimators are consistent. "For studies in political science using TSCS data it will almost always be the case that the unobserved local factors are captured by and correlated with X; indeed, the main reason to abandon the standard pooled OLS is because we think such a correlation is likely to exist." (Wilson/ Butler 2003: 8) At least under this condition, random effects models are second best options of a potentially dubious quality. We will later see that random effects models do not work significantly better than pooled OLS.
Even if the data satisfies the random effects assumptions of strict exogeneity and orthogonality between and , random effects models share the poor small sample properties of GLS. As a consequence, one should expect that the random effects procedure gives biased and inefficient estimates of the true betas in relatively small samples.
To overcome the problem of random effects inconsistency, Hausman and Taylor (1981) advocated the use of instruments for the variables that are likely to be correlated with the random effects. Unfortunately, this correlation is unobservable and thus it requires some imagination to correctly specify the Hausman-Taylor model. This is rarely a trivial problem. The estimated coefficients largely vary with researchers' decision which variables are endogenous and which variables are exogenous to the random effects. Hence, the Hausman-Taylor procedure leaves researchers with a discretionary choice that largely influences the results.
As a straightforward remedy for the apparent problem of choosing a set of instruments in the presence of an unknown correlation between the right-hand side variables and the random effects, Hausman and Taylor suggest using the exogenous variables that vary over time and are not correlated with the individualspecific part of the error term (x1) to instrument the variables correlated with (x2 and z2 of eqs. 2 and 3). Deviations from the mean of x1 are used to produce unbiased estimates for the time varying variables (x2) and the mean of x1 is used as an instrument for the time-invariant variable (z2). While Hausman and Taylor simply assume that x1 and z1 are uncorrelated with u, the applied researcher faces the problem of distinguishing endogenous from exogenous right-hand side variables. Moreover, it must not be the case that x1 and z1 are good instruments for x2 and z2, respectively. The poor quality of the instrument suggested has frequently raised some concerns and alternative proposals. See Breusch, Mizon and Schmidt's (1989) proposal of feasible instruments and Amemiya and MaCurdy (1986). 4 Having said this, we hasten to admit that there is at least one potential source of bias: As in all pure cross-sectional models, we cannot control for omitted variable bias in the estimation of the time-invariant variables in the second stage. An additional source of bias is the distribution of the fixed effects. If unit-fixed effects are not normally distributed, OLS estimates may be biased if N is small .
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Upon request we provide a STATA program (ado-file) that executes all three steps and adjusts the variance-covariance matrix. Several options, like ar1 errorcorrection and robust VC-matrix are allowed.
This procedure adopts the robustness of the fixed effects model and allows for correlation between explanatory variables and the unobserved individual effects.
The effects of time varying factors are consistently analyzed and remain unbiased.
Since fixed effects are robust with respect to potential correlation between right hand side variables and the individual specific effects the exogeneity of explanatory variables is not required.
In econometric terms, the fevd technique works as follows. Recall the datagenerating process of eqs. 1-3. The within estimator de-means the data and removes the individual effects :
Thus, the fixed effects are
In the second stage we regress the on the z-variables.
where is the intercept of the stage 2 equation and ϖ i η is the error. Note that we get a biased estimate of if we exclude variables that are simultaneously correlated with the unit-effects and the time-invariant variables . As one can see, is the part of that is not explained by the time invariant z-matrix. the standard errors we explicitly control for the specific characteristics of the three step approach. 6 On the other hand, stage 3 also accounts for the potential multicollinearity between the time-variant variables and the time-invariant variables.
Estimating stage 3 by pooled OLS further requires that heteroscedasticity and serial correlation must be eliminated beforehand. We suggest running a robust Sandwich-estimator or/and model the dynamics by an MA1 process (PraisWinston transformation of the original data).
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At least in theory this method has three obvious advantages: a) the fixed effects vector decomposition does not require prior knowledge of correlation between the explanatory variables and the unit specific effects, b) the estimator relies on the robustness of the within-transformation and does not need to meet the orthogonality assumptions of random effects, and c) xtfevd maintains the consistency and efficiency of OLS.
Monte Carlo Experiments
Given the properties of the unit effects decomposition technique there are good reasons to believe that this estimator is superior to pooled OLS, random effects and Hausman-Taylor if the empirical model includes time-invariant variables in panel data. We now report a series of Monte Carlo experiments which aim at assessing the performance of the available procedures in fairly small samples which are typical for comparative politics. We will demonstrate that xtfevd does better than its alternatives in situations common to applied political research.
Before discussing the results of the Monte Carlo experiments, however, we briefly describe the design of the experiments.
Design of the Experiments
All experiments use simulated data, which are generated to discriminate between the various estimators, while at the same time mimic some properties of panel data. Specifically, the data generating process underlying our simulations is as follows:
where the x-variables are time varying and the z-variables are time-invariant, both groups are drawn from a normal distribution. Variables x3 and z3 are correlated with the unit specific effect .
i u 8 Variables x1, x2, z1 and z2 are uncorrelated with . We draw from a normal distribution in the first series of experiments and from a gamma distribution in the second series of experiments. This allows to test the sensitivity of the various procedures to unit effects that are not normally distributed. In real data, unit fixed effects are unlikely to be normally distributed.
The idiosyncratic error is white noise and repeatedly drawn from a normal distribution, and the R-squared is fixed at 50 percent for all experiments. 
Analysis of simulated data
We are interested in the bias and the efficiency of the estimators. We define bias as the average deviation of the coefficients from the true coefficients,
where { } k 1, 2,..., K = is the number of simulations. For the purpose of this paper we define efficiency as the standard deviation of the betas
To begin, we consider the bias ( ) Hausman-Taylor is not only the most biased, but it also performs poorly with respect to the time-invariant variables. It is the only specification that is likely to report biased coefficients of time-invariant variables uncorrelated with the unit effects. Since this result may come as a surprise it is important to note that we correctly specified the endogenous variables. Bias surges if researchers make a incorrect decision about exogeneity.
OLS and random effects models fail to give an unbiased coefficients of the timevariant variable that is correlated with the unit fixed effects (x3). This outcome is expected because -having assumed unit effects correlated with x3 -we clearly observe omitted variable bias here. Neither pooled OLS nor random effects models capture this effect unless the number of observations approaches infinity and random effects converge to the fixed effects estimator. ( ) σ β
Sample size and bias
The preceding subsection has shown that on average and when analyzing wellbehaved data xtfevd performs better than its competitors. In this subsection we examine whether the estimators' bias and efficiency vary with the sample size.
We study the performance of the procedures for all permutations of Pooled OLS and random effects work better when we consider time-invariant variables correlated with the unit fixed effects. Table 4 shows that no procedure is likely to produce unbiased coefficients for time-invariant variables correlated with the unit effects, but Hausman-Taylor performs worse than the other three alternatives.
table 4 about here
Bias decreases as the number of cross-sections increases but applied researchers should nevertheless keep in mind that the coefficients of time-invariant variables correlated with the unit effects are likely to be upward biased. In many cases this knowledge will prevent applied researchers from making careless inferences.
The random effects specification works best for time-constant variables correlated with individual effects and this holds especially true when the unit effects are skewed. If the unit effects are drawn from a normal distribution the difference between random effects models and xtfevd becomes small and lies within the sampling variance. Most noteworthy, the Hausman-Taylor procedure is worse than any alternative including pooled OLS. The bias is large regardless of the distribution of unit effects. This outcome is probably due to a combination of poor small sample properties and an insufficient quality of instruments. It appears that using Hausman-Taylor has some similarity to organizing a coefficient lottery.
To sum up, all procedures give unbiased estimates of time-variant and timeinvariant variables that are uncorrelated with the unit-effects. In most real data analyzed in comparative politics, the unit effects are likely to be correlated with the explanatory variables. While xtfevd and Hausman-Taylor work much better than random effects and pooled OLS when time-variant variables are correlated with the unit effects, Hausman-Taylor is unreliable in cases where time-invariant variables are correlated with unit effects. This possibility should not be dismissed.
Fortunately, xtfevd and random effects generate relatively unbiased coefficients for time-invariant variables.
Under normal conditions, the fixed effects decomposition works in no respect worse than any of its alternatives. Thus, we recommend that applied researchers employ this procedure. Only if a) time-invariant variables are correlated with the unit effects and b) the unit effects are skewed, researchers should avoid using
xtfevd.
10 Under these circumstances the random effects model seems to be the least biased choice. One should keep in mind, however, that random effects obtains biased coefficients for time-variant variables correlated with unit-effects.
Sample size and efficiency
Small samples are prone to large variation in the estimated betas. This holds especially true for the effect of time-invariant variables, because the number of observation is T times smaller than the number of observations of time-variant variables. Consequently, efficiency is a crucial issue.
The calculation of efficiency is based on the same experiments as the preceding discussion of bias. Table 5 presents the estimators' efficiency with respect to the time-variant variable co-varying with the unit effects.
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The output of xtfevd.ado provides information on the correlation between the unit effects and the endogenous variables and on the skewness of the unit effects. 
Re-estimation of Huber/ Stephens 2001
Huber and Stephens aim at explaining the long-term patterns of welfare state development in respect to the short-and long-term dynamics as well as the cross-sectional variance. This constitutionalism variable is ordinally scaled and ranks from 0 to 6. Since it is almost time-invariant, they estimate the model by pooled OLS.
This research strategy has at least one obvious drawback: It is impossible to identify the effect of each single constitutional variable. However, the impact of the various constitutional features on government spending is likely to be unequal across the various veto points. Implicitly, Huber and Stephens assume that the effect of federalism and bicameralism on government spending and social security transfers is exactly twice as large as the effects of presidentialism and referenda.
For that reason, we have not only re-analyzed the Huber-Stephens specification ( to the effect of the population share of individuals older than 65 years, of authoritarian legacy and of inflation. First, we find that the population share of individuals above 65 has no significant effect on social security transfers. Second, once we split Huber and Stephens' composite constitutional constraints index into its original components, we find that authoritarian legacy significantly reduces social security transfers. Third, we also obtain a significant impact of inflation on social security transfers if we control for unit effects. Finally, the composite index poorly, and that failure to reject the unit root hypothesis does not imply that data is non-stationary. We nevertheless add an appendix in which we estimate a model in differences.
13 http://www.lisproject.org/publications/welfaredata/welfareaccess.htm.
14 As a matter of fact, the STATA results of the updated dataset exhibit more significant relations between the exogenous and the endogenous variable and provide larger support for Huber and Stephens theoretical claims than the models reported in their book.
of Huber and Stephens conceals more than it reveals. The effect of constitutional constraints on social security benefits is not homogenous. While federalism and presidentialism reduces social security benefits as suggested by Huber and Stephens theoretical claims, neither bicameralism nor referenda (a Switzerland dummy) appear to be significantly related to social transfers.
Probably to the satisfaction of the authors, we find no difference to any of the coefficients Huber and Stephens are theoretically interested in. Our analyses, therefore, provide additional support for the theories more broadly discussed by Huber and Stephens. 16 However, we find significance for our assumption that the aggregation of constitutional rules into a summary variable is not useful. To be sure, Huber and Stephens correctly argue that veto points limit the observed rise of the welfare state. But different constitutional settings do not have identical effects. Bicameralism exerts the strongest influence on government spending, followed by presidentialism. Neither federalism nor referenda are significantly related to government spending if we rely upon fixed effect vector decomposition.
Re-estimation of Beramendi/ Cusack 2004
Pablo Beramendi and Thomas Cusack's (unpublished) paper studies the determinants of income inequality in OECD countries. Beramendi and Cusack distinguish between three types of income, wages, total income from economic activity and disposable income. Thus, their analyses allow isolating the redistributive efforts of governments. We re-estimate model 11 of their discussion paper version, which examines the determinants of disposable income, broadly defined as market income plus government transfers minus taxes. The model controls for pre-tax inequality and also contains union density and 'left government inheritance'.
Model 11 includes one time-invariant variable, a dummy that controls for See appendix A for a regressions in differences.
workers. As a consequence, coordinated market economies are associated with more redistribution and less after tax and transfers income inequality.
Beramendi and Cusack justify running a pooled OLS model without eliminating serial correlation of errors and controlling for unit effects in the following way:
"In the context of data sets in which the variance is dominated by the 'between units' (as opposed to the "within units") component and where there are time invariant independent variables, the inclusion of both FE and a LDV frequently does more harm than good. Let us briefly explain why. Consider first the inclusion of fixed effects in any specification with a time invariant independent variable, such as the institutional terms in the wage and disposable income inequality equations or the wage inequality measure itself in the market income equation. In such cases, the specific value each country takes in the independent variable is going to be highly collinear with that country's FE. As a result, the inclusion of FE yields substantively uninteresting and generally misleading results in which none of the variables of interest are statistically significant and yet the adjusted rsquared increases dramatically due to multicollinearity." (Beramendi/ Cusack 2004: 29) We do not agree, but that's another issue (see Plümper et al. 2004 ). In passing, we may say that -quite to our surprise -the information on the is only 0.37. All other variables are even less correlated with the unit fixed effects.
In any case, we find a smaller coefficient for the time-invariant variable -the coordinated market economy dummy -but the interpretation of Beramendi and Cusack remains intact. The negligible influence of controlling for unit fixed effects may easily stem from the comparably low correlation between the unit effects and the exogenous variables. As we know from OLS, excluded variables cause little bias if they are orthogonal to the included exogenous variables. Their results are also robust to the inclusion of additional or the exclusion of present regressors.
Discussion of Re-Analyses
We draw two conclusions from our re-analyzes of two interesting and important studies in comparative politics and comparative political economy. And this directly leads to our second conclusion: Large empirical models (as the one suggested by Huber and Stephens) are likely to suffer from collinearity and endogeneity. From our perspective, it is more promising to estimate smaller empirical specifications that more closely represent the theoretical claims. In this case, however, researchers almost must control for unit-effects and should run estimators that do not require orthogonality between the unit effects and the substantive explanatory variables. This is the domain of the unit effects vector decomposition technique.
Conclusion
The results of the Monte Carlo experiments suggest that xtfevd is the least biased estimator when time-variant and time-invariant variables are correlated with the unit effects. This constellation appears to be common to social science data.
The unit fixed effects vector decomposition technique produces the least biased and most efficient coefficients under a wide variety of data generating processes. 
